Abstract WG-7 is a stream cipher based on WG stream cipher and has been designed by Luo et al. (2010) . This cipher is designed for low cost and lightweight applications (RFID tags and mobile phones, for instance). This paper addresses cryptographic weaknesses of WG-7 stream cipher. We show that the key stream generated by WG-7 can be distinguished from a random sequence after knowing 2 13.5 keystream bits and with a negligible error probability. Also, we investigate the security of WG-7 against algebraic attacks. An algebraic key recovery attack on this cipher is proposed. The attack allows to recover both the internal state and the secret key with the time complexity about 2 27 .
submitted to the ECRYPT call. Both WG-7 and WG are hardware-oriented stream ciphers that use a word-oriented linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a filter function based on the Welch-Gong (WG) transformation [8] . The structure of WG-7 is similar to the WG stream cipher. Both ciphers use LFSRs and filtering functions, however, WG works in GF (2 29 ) but WG-7 in GF(2 7 ). WG-7 uses a 80-bit secret key and a 81-bit initial vector (IV). WG-7 works as follows. First the secret key and IV are used to initialise the internal state of the cipher LFSR. Next, the LFSR with its nonlinear function is clocked 46 times. After this initialisation procedure the cipher generates an appropriate string of keystreams that is used for encryption.
We assume that the initialisation procedure of WG-7 is performed as prescribed. Consequently, the internal state consists of 161 bits. Note that the security level claimed by the designers is 80 bits. The cipher has been designed for encryption in resource restricted environments such as RFID applications, mobile phones and smart cards. The authors of the cipher analysed the design and concluded that WG-7 [10] is secure against time/memory/data tradeoff attacks, differential attacks, algebraic attacks and correlation attacks.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a brief description of the keystream generator of WG-7 stream cipher. Section 3 deals with a cryptographic weaknesses of the algorithm, which leads to our distinguishing and key recovery attacks.
Description of WG-7
The structure of the WG-7 stream cipher is illustrated in Fig. 1 . It consists of a 23-word LFSR, where a single word is 7-bit long. The filter function WG is a nonlinear function defined for 7 boolean variables (a word). The word is an element of F 2 7 , where the finite field F 2 7 is defined by the primitive polynomial g(x) = x 7 + x + 1 over GF (2) . The characteristic polynomial of LFSR is primitive over F 2 7 and is given by:
where β is a root of g (x) . The nonlinear filter function WG(x) denoted in Fig. 1 as WG is a transformation F 2 7 → F 2 and defined below: Fig. 1 The WG-7 stream cipher scheme
Cryptanalysis of WG-7
In this section, we describe our two attacks for WG-7. The first attack distinguishes the WG-7 stream cipher from the random one. The attack exploits a bias in a linear approximation of the nonlinear filter function. The second attack is a variant of the fast algebraic attack. It permits to recover not only the internal state of the cipher but also the secret key.
Distinguishing attack for WG-7
The WG-7 stream cipher has a relatively simple structure. The main component is LFSR that generates words that are later transformed in a nonlinear fashion by the filter function. The only nonlinear component in the cipher is the filter function. It seems to be a quite reasonable idea to check how well the filter function can be approximated by an affine function. In other words, we are looking for an affine function that approximates the filter function as close as possible (the best linear approximation). If we apply the well-known Walsh-Hadamard transform to the filter function, then we can obtain such linear approximation. Denote it by · (x 0 , ..., x 6 ) + α, where x i is the i-th bit of the word x, the sign "·" is the inner product, ( ∈ F 2 7 ) is a constant (a vector of 7 binary constants) and α is a binary constant. In case of WG-7, we have found out that there are seven affine functions, which are the best linear approximation (one of such functions is 1 + x 0 + x 1 + x 4 ). As the nonlinearity of the filter function is 52, we can find the following probability
From (1), the following recursive relation can be derived:
Consequently, we need to find the best linear approximation of the relation given below:
Remark 1 The Piling up Lemma cannot be used to compute the bias of (5) because the input variables (S i+23 , S i+11 , S i ) are not independent. In particular, S i+23 is correlated with other variables by (1). In addition, β · S i in (4) is linear transformation of S i . The precise linear relations are given below
We need to determine the exact value of the bias ε in the following probability:
One method to compute the bias in (7) is as follows. We consider the bias between three output bits at clocks i, i + 11 and i + 23. So we get
Observe that (8) is a boolean function with 14 input variables (instead of 21 variables) and a single bit output. In other words, S i+23 depends on S i and S i+11 based on (4) and (6) . Let F · GF(2 14 ) → GF(2) be a non-linear boolean function in form of
Now, we focus on
) that is an unbalanced boolean function, where
The relation given by (9) defines a distinguisher, which is able to tell apart the output of the stream cipher from a truly random cipher with the probability expressed by (10) . The interesting question is: are there better biases to mount a distinguishing attack? We will discuss possible answers in the remaining part of this section.
Better biases In the previous section, we have found a linear approximation leading us to a distinguishing attack. One would wonder whether it is possible to find a better linear approximation so that the bias is closer to the maximal value of 0.5. Let us explore this issue in more detail. Repeated squaring of the characteristic polynomial of LFSR (see (1) ) gives other linear recurrence polynomials. If we use the exponent 2 7 , we get
Since β = β 2 7 , β ∈ F 2 7 , the summation of (1) and (11) gives:
It means that the attacker can derive a bitwise linear equation, which is valid for the internal state of LFSR. Similar to the previous subsection, the function F can be built as follows:
Equation (14) 
The required data Now, we explain the amount of output sequences required to distinguish WG-7 from a truly random cipher. The following theorem determines the required length of keystream needed to distinguish between two random sequences, where one is uniform (both binary values occur with 1 2 ) and the other is biased (one value occurs with 1 2 (1 + ε))-see [11] .
Theorem 1 Given two binary random sequences, where the f irst is uniform and the other is biased, i.e. one binary value occurs with the probability 1 2 (1 + ε) while the other with the probability 1 2 (1 − ε). Then we need to observe O( 1 ε 2 ) bits in order to distinguish the two distributions with a non-negligible probability of success.
In this case, the amount of data required for proposed distinguishing attack is 2 13.56 bits. This amount of data can be collected from consecutive (or non-consecutive) keystream and even from one session key or different session keys in various times.
The result of the implemented distinguishing attack on WG-7 stream cipher are shown in Table 1 . We have repeated the experiment 1,000 times to compute the success rate of distinguishing attack with different lengths of output sequences.
Key recovery attack on WG-7
In this section, we apply an algebraic analysis to recover the initial state of the cipher and consequently the secret key. Our attack can recover internal states of WG-7 and then attacker is able to clock the LFSR backward and find the secret key correctly. The designers of the WG-7 stream cipher have claimed that there is no algebraic attack with the complexity smaller than the exhaustive search and with the data complexity smaller than 2 24 of consecutive keystream bits. The idea of our attack is as follows. Let L : GF(2 161 ) → GF(2 161 ) be a multivariate linear transformation that corresponds to the linear transformation defined by a single clock. This transformation is done on the whole state of 23 registers each holding 7 bits (23 · 7 = 161).
Let z t , t = 0, 1, 2, ... be the keystream generated by the cipher after running the state initialization algorithm of WG-7. Assume also that f is the non-linear filter function WG illustrated in Fig. 1 . We consider f as a non-linear map defined from GF(2 7 ) → GF (2) . As the output bit is calculated on the contents of the last register or bits from 154 to 160, we denote this by f (T(s 0 , ..., s 160 ) ), where T(s 0 , ..., s 160 ) extracts the 7-bit content of the last register. So, we can establish the following system of relations for the cipher: (T(s 0 , ..., s 160 ) ) (L(s 0 , ..., s 160 )) ) ...
where f (T(L t (s 0 , ..., s 160 ))) indicates the output keystream at the clock t, generated by the stream cipher. Now, the cryptanalytic problem can be converted into the problem of solving a system of nonlinear equations (see [1, 3, 4, 6, 7] ).
Algebraic attack on WG-7
The simplest scenario to solve System (16) is known as the linearization technique [5, 7] . The function f is of degree 5. The number N of monomials of degree smaller or equal to 5 is
Each of these monomials can be considered as a new variable and then the attacker can solve the non-linear system with ≈ 2 29.65 equations and time complexity ≈ 2 29.65×log 7 2 by the Gaussian elimination method. Consequently, the complexity of the attack is larger than the exhaustive key search.
The important idea to improve the efficiency of the above attack is to reduce the degree of the equations. To this end, the attacker tries to find an annihilator function so that f · g = 0 and deg g < deg f . The steps to apply the attack can be described as follows:
1. Finding an annihilator g of f or f ⊕ 1 with a low degree d. The algebraic normal form (ANF) of f is as follows:
The best annihilator is of the form: Improved attack on WG-7 Fast algebraic attacks (see [3, 7, 9] ) on stream ciphers that use LFSR are based on equations of type zX e + X d with e < d. This is a shorthand to describe that at least one equation of type
exists, where g and h are some multivariate polynomials of degree e and d (e < d) respectively, and z = f (s 0 , ..., s n−1 ). The attack can be summarized as follows:
for some linear combination
. The same equation applies to each window of D consecutive steps and we will write it E times, for E overlapping intervals, with
. This is because we need to get the final system of the degree e that is solvable by linearisation (with the complexity E log 7
2 ). This approach is discussed in [1, 2, 7, 9] . The steps of our improved attack are summarized as follows: 2 ).
In case of WG-7, to apply the fast algebraic attack, we have found the boolean functions g and h and they are: The data complexity of the fast algebraic attack on WG-7 is Table 2 summarizes the results of our attacks.
Conclusions
In this paper, the security of the WG-7 stream cipher has been investigated. We have shown that distinguishing attack works with a high probability of success after observing 2 13.5 keystream bits. Additionally, the key recovery attack has been described that can recover the secret key with the time complexity about 2 27 and the data complexity 2 19.38 . The presented results have proved that the WG-7 stream cipher is not secure and therefore, it is not recommended to be used.
